| 机构投资者的代理风险及其约束机制 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 万俊毅.机构投资者的代理风险及其约束机制[J].中央财政金融学院学报,2005(6):48-52. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 万俊毅 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 华南农业大学经济管理学院 广州 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 华南农业大学校科研和教改项目 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 机构投资者的代理风险是客观存在的.报酬合约、声誉激励、法律条款和机构投资者之间的必要竞争等都是机构投资者道德风险行为的有效制约手段,这些相互补充的机制使得机构投资者将其败德行为收敛在社会投资人可接受的范围内,机构投资者因而能够获得委托人源源不断的资金支持.
|
| 关 键 词： | 机构投资者 代理风险 约束机制 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-1549(2005)06-0048-05 |
| 修稿时间： | 2005年3月6日 |
A Study of Institutional Investor's Agency Risk and Its Restrictive Mechanism |
| |
| WAN Jun-yi.A Study of Institutional Investor''''s Agency Risk and Its Restrictive Mechanism[J].Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics,2005(6):48-52. |
| |
| Authors: | WAN Jun-yi |
| |
| Abstract: | The agency risk of institutional investor is existed objectively. A lot of effective means such as pay agreement, reputation encouragement, law measures and competition of institutional investors, etc. which are complementary, can constrain institutional investor to pull back its moral hazard behaviors to the extent of social investor acceptance. Thus, institutional investor can obtain client's funds continually. |
| |
| Keywords: | Institutional investor Agency risk Restrictive mechanism |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 维普 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
