我国上市公司管理层收购财务绩效的实证研究

管理层收购(MBO)是优化公司治理结构、降低代理成本、充分发挥企业家才能,从而提高公司财务绩效的有效途径。本文以我国深、沪两市中具有代表性的24家上市公司为样本,采用合成数据(Panel Date)截面回归的计量模型,对我国上市公司MBO的财务绩效问题进行了实证研究,结果表明:(1)在比较低的管理层持股比例下,MBO并未提高我国上市公司的财务绩效,且管理层持股比例与公司财务绩效成反向关系;(2)管理层收购前后,公司每股净资产均呈向上的凸性;每股收益随着管理层持股比例的扩大而呈递减趋势。

A Positive Study of Finance Performance of Listed Companies ' MBO of China

Management buyout(MBO) is an effective method of optimizing corporate governance,reducing agency cost,making best use of enterprisers' talents and improving finance performance.This paper uses panel data of 24 companies listed in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchange to test finance performance of listed companies' MBO positively.The result shows that:(1) under the condition of lower ratio of stocks owned by the managers,MBO does not improve the finance performance of listed companies and the opposite relationship is found between them;(2) near the time of MBO,net assets per share of the company show the property of upward convexity;and the earnings per share reducing with the increasing of ratio of stocks owned by the managers.