| 非对称信息下保险代理人激励机制分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 边文霞.非对称信息下保险代理人激励机制分析[J].中央财政金融学院学报,2004(11):48-51. |
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| 作者姓名： | 边文霞 |
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| 作者单位： | 首都经济贸易大学 北京 |
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| 摘 要： | 当前我国保险代理人中存在大量的违规操作行为,本文运用霍姆斯特姆和米尔格罗姆的多项任务委托--代理模型对保险代理人的佣金制度进行深入剖析,得出对保险代理人的薪酬激励不应单纯地重视业务数量,而应促其重视业务质量,最后给出相关激励机制建议.
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| 关 键 词： | 激励机制 委托--代理模型 确定性等价收入 |
| 文章编号： | 1000-1549(2004)11-0048-04 |
| 修稿时间： | 2004年6月20日 |
Analysis on Principal-agent Model of Insurance Agents |
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| BIAN Wen-xia.Analysis on Principal-agent Model of Insurance Agents[J].Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics,2004(11):48-51. |
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| Authors: | BIAN Wen-xia |
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| Institution: | BIAN Wen-xia |
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| Abstract: | There are plenty of contrary operation behavior among Chinese insurance agents currently. This article deeply research the commission system of insurance agents by multi - tasks principal - agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom. As a result, the salary drive to insurance agents should not be supposed to be service quantity only, but also emphasis on service quality. In the end, this article prompts some relative suggestions on incentive mechanism. |
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| Keywords: | The incentive mechanism Principal - agent model Assured value-equaled income |
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