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国有银行制度的政府退出行为:一个国家能力视角的分析
引用本文:官兵.国有银行制度的政府退出行为:一个国家能力视角的分析[J].中央财政金融学院学报,2006(3).
作者姓名:官兵
作者单位:中央财经大学金融学院 北京
摘    要:国有银行制度安排既是改革开放以来增进当期国家能力的有效工具,也可能极大地削弱未来多期的国家能力。因此,理性的政府会选择合适的时机退出对国有银行的控制,从而实现国家垄断租金最大化与社会产出最大化目标之间的重合。

关 键 词:国有银行  国家能力  政府退出

Government Secession from State-Owned Bank under a Perspective of State's Capacity
GUAN Bing.Government Secession from State-Owned Bank under a Perspective of State''''s Capacity[J].Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics,2006(3).
Authors:GUAN Bing
Abstract:State-owned bank system could impair the future state's capacity, although it certainly is the effective tools in improving state's capacity since reform and opening up. Hence, rational government will choose the right time for loosing the control of state-owned bank system, which can achieve inosculation between the maximum of state's monopolized rent and the ones of social produce.
Keywords:State-Owned bank State's capacity Government secession
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