财政存款、银行竞争与僵尸企业形成

银行以优惠利率贷款为低质企业“输血”,是企业僵尸化的重要成因。然而,基于中国背景的文献,对银行“输血”动机的研究并不充分,本文从地方财政存款影响银行信贷分配的视角,分析僵尸企业形成的内在机理。首先,通过构建理论模型对银行竞争财政存款及影响企业融资和投资绩效进而僵尸化的逻辑进行刻画,而后依据省份财政存款、银行竞争与微观企业财务数据,对理论推论进行了验证。研究发现,财政存款占当地存款比重越大,企业僵尸化概率越高,并且银行竞争助长了企业僵尸化。此外,基于工具变量估计处理了核心变量的内生性问题,并进行了多种稳健性检验。机制检验表明,财政存款的信贷分配效应,促使企业过度投资,导致经营绩效恶化,进而提高了企业僵尸化概率,银行竞争则会加剧该效应。本文拓展了财政存款的经济效应与僵尸企业形成方面的文献,对于僵尸企业治理有一定参考意义。

Fiscal Deposits,Bank Competition and the Formation of Zombie Firms

At the beginning of 2018, six ministries and commissions, including the National Development and Reform Commission, required the disposal of zombie firms to resolve excess capacity. Further research on the internal formation mechanism of zombie firms and its removal is important for promoting the development of the real economy. What is the root cause of Chinese zombie firms？ Studies have found that zombie firms are created when banks cover up non-performing loans or government management. However, Chinese banks do not issue zombie credit to intentionally cover up non-performing loans. What is the mechanism that motivates commercial banks to issue zombie credit, external pressure or internal economic motives？ This paper analyzes the mechanism behind zombie firms, focusing on the effect of local fiscal deposits on bank credit distribution.This paper constructs a theoretical model to analyze the mechanism behind the formation of Chinese zombie firms. The model shows that local fiscal deposits contribute to firms zombification by affecting bank credit allocation, resulting in over-investment by firms and less efficient business operations. This study uses the China Banking Regulatory Commission's website to acquire commercial bank branches' financial license data. The commercial bank's name, approved date of establishment, and other information are used to create provincial-level banking competition indicators. The theoretical hypothesis is tested empirically with data on fiscal deposits and China's industrial firms from 2005 to 2013.The study found that greater proportions of fiscal deposits in local deposits increase the probability of firms zombification. The study also found that bank competition promotes firms zombification. The government's ability to negotiate with banks increases as the competition between regional banks increases. The banks affect the allocation of credit resources and accelerate firms zombification by competing over fiscal depositions. The study's mechanism test shows that fiscal deposits' credit distribution effect promotes over-investment in some firms. The over-investment results in worse operating performance, increasing the probability of firms zombification. The banks' competition intensifies the effect. Local governments are more inclined to influence bank credit decisions through fiscal deposits in areas with a low degree of marketization. The degree of competition among banks has a weak relationship with the zombification of large firms and state-owned firms. The degree of competition has a strong relationship with the zombification of small or non-state-owned firms that are often subject to credit discrimination. The banks begin to win over small or non-state-owned firms as the banks' competition intensifies, increasing the probability of the firms' zombification.This paper provides two policy implications based on its empirical findings. First, the removal and prevention of zombie firms will require fewer government subsidies for inefficient firms, regulations for local fiscal deposit management, improvements to the fiscal deposit bidding system, and more efficient allocation of fiscal deposits. Second, the supervisory authority must take appropriate measures to guide banks toward reasonable competition, encourage local banks to expand financing channels, and jointly improve economic efficiency and high-quality economic development.The paper offers the following contributions. First, this paper advances the literature on fiscal deposits by analyzing their role in firms zombification; second, this paper shows that bank competition intensifies zombification; finally, the findings are significant for the governance of zombie firms. The management of fiscal deposit accounts should be standardized when cleaning up zombie firms.