公司社会声望与高管薪酬:公共服务抑或职业声誉

本文基于“隐性—显性”契约激励研究范式,探讨公司社会声望对高管薪酬的影响以及作用机制。本文选取2009—2017年间的非金融A股上市公司为样本,研究发现,拥有较高社会声望的公司,其高管显性薪酬较低。具体而言,公共地位较高的国有企业、具有较高市场声誉的民营上市公司,其高管薪酬平均而言分别比其他上市公司低4.97%和6.30%。进一步地,我们发现公司声望对我国高管显性薪酬契约存在两种作用机制:一方面,公共地位较高的国有企业,可以为高管带来较高的社会声誉和社会认可,满足了“公共服务”类高管的社会声望偏好,从而降低了显性薪酬的支付水平;另一方面,市场声誉较高的民营企业,可以为高管带来较高的职业声誉和未来职业利益,符合“以商为荣”类高管的社会声望偏好,使高管愿意接受较低的显性薪酬。本文的结论为公司声望作为一种有价值的资源,可以对高管显性薪酬形成议价能力提供了重要证据,揭示了公司声望对高管显性契约激励的影响路径;同时,为国有企业高管薪酬契约设计以及激励机制提供了一定启示。

Corporate Reputation and Executive Compensation: Public Service or Career Reputation

Explicit incentives based on the salary contract and implicit incentives based on reputation and vocational development are the most common incentives for company executives. In recent years, due to the unexplainable paradox between low explicit executive compensation and rapid business growth, scholars have increasingly examined the role of implicit incentives in executive contracts, especially the reputation and vocational development incentives. In particular, due to the salary ceiling, executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and management fees are strictly controlled. However, executive positions in SOEs have great professional appeal, making it necessary to examine the role of compensation contracts in corporate governance and the special role of executive incentive mechanisms.As an ancient Chinese adage goes, “the heart of a scholar and the idea that the world is for all.” Based on that notion, intellectuals often serve society by joining the bureaucracy. Serving in an SOE is another way to improve one's public status and gain social recognition.Since the beginning of China's reform and opening up, especially in the 1990s, some officials have given up their positions to go into business, creating a culture of pride in business. In the context of the current economic transformation and market prosperity, many people are no longer attached to the idea of “serving in a government department” and believe that they could gain a professional reputation and realize their value by holding a position in a company.Based on the implicit-explicit contract incentive research paradigm, this paper investigates the effect of corporate reputation on executive compensation and its mechanism of influence. Using data from non-financial A-share listed firms from 2009 to 2017, the main conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) corporate social reputation is a valuable resource that can satisfy the reputation preferences of senior executives such that they are willing to accept lower explicit compensation. (2) Under the special institutional background of “ambition to public service” and “pride in business” in China, different types of corporate social prestige have different effects on executive compensation. (3) Using a DID model to investigate changes in executive compensation after companies enter and exit the ranks of prestigious companies, we find that companies with high social prestige pay low executive compensation. After propensity score matching, the regression results support our hypothesis. (4) The results also show that after working in a company with a good reputation, senior executives not only have a greater reputation incentive but also have greater future career interest. Compared with those working at general listed companies, such executives are more likely to be promoted.The main contributions of this paper are as follows. First, this paper is motivated by the research perspective of personal reputation and examines the influence of personal reputation on executive motivation from the perspective of corporate reputation, expanding the literature on the influencing factors of explicit executive compensation. Second, based on the traditional concept of public service and preferences for obtaining professional reputation, we discuss two mechanisms of the influence of corporate social reputation on explicit executive compensation. Third, the results show that corporate social reputation can be used as compensation or as a substitute for monetary compensation for senior executives, enriching the literature on the internal substitution factors of executive compensation. In addition, in the context of compensation regulations, this study provides a better understanding of corporate reputation and executive compensation bargaining power, and provides a meaningful reference for companies to improve their governance efficiency and design effective compensation contracts.