高管团队内部治理与企业资本结构调整——基于非CEO高管独立性的视角

本文以2001-2017年A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了高管团队内部治理对企业资本结构的影响。研究发现:当企业负债不足时,高管团队内部治理效应能够显著提高企业(尤其是非国有企业)的负债水平,降低企业实际资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。这种高管团队内部治理效应在第一类委托代理问题比较严重以及非CEO高管监督动机较强的企业中更加显著。作用机制分析表明,高管团队内部治理效应能够通过降低第一类代理成本来降低企业资本结构与目标资本结构的偏离程度。本文的研究结论为改善我国上市公司治理提供了新的思路,对于优化企业融资结构、深化金融供给侧结构性改革具有一定的启示意义。

Internal Governance and Capital Structure Adjustment: Evidence from the Perspective of Non-CEO Executives' Independence

Decisions regarding capital structure directly affect long-term corporate performance and value.Morellec,Nikolov,and Schurhoff(2012)emphasize the role of agency conflicts in corporate financing decisions and develop a tradeoff model to investigate the importance of manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice.Following Morellec et al.(2012),other studies investigate the roles of various corporate governance mechanisms,such as external governance mechanisms,board oversight,and executive compensation contracts,in alleviating the problem of sub-optimal capital structures caused by the conflicts between shareholders and managers.However,most studies focus on individual CEOs as the representatives of the top management team,the roles of non-CEO executives in corporate decision-making have not been fully examined.Non-CEO executives have a significant influence on corporate decision-making as they are the implementers of business decisions,and thus monitor and constrain the self-interested behavior of CEOs.The internal monitoring that takes place from the bottom up within a top management team(TMT)is known as TMT internal governance.The effectiveness of internal governance within a TMT requires non-CEO executives to be independent from the CEO.In China,a CEO has the right to propose the appointment or dismissal of non-CEO executives.The CEO may prefer to select non-CEO executives who share similar values,and these executives may also be grateful to the CEO who hired them,thus diminishing their monitoring role.In this study,we use the proportion of the top four highest-paid non-CEO executives appointed before a current CEO’s arrival to measure TMT internal governance.The larger this proportion,the greater the independence of non-CEO executives and the stronger the TMT internal governance.Using a sample of Chinese listed companies from 2001 to 2017,we investigate the effect of TMT internal governance on capital structure decisions.We find that TMT internal governance significantly increases a firm's leverage when its actual leverage is lower than the target leverage ratio,particularly for non-state-owned enterprises(non-SOEs).In addition,the effect of TMT internal governance is greater for firms with more severe agency problems and those with non-CEO executives who have stronger incentives to monitor the CEO.Our analysis of the mechanism reveals that TMT internal governance reduces the degree of deviation from the target leverage ratio by reducing the agency costs.Our study contributes to the literature on corporate governance and capital structure and has important policy implications for the further development of the corporate governance of Chinese listed companies.Our study contributes to the literature focusing on the impact of corporate governance on capital structure decisions by taking the perspective of TMT internal governance,which has previously been neglected.Our study also provides policy implications for improving corporate governance and optimizing capital structures.