房价调控、地方政府债务与宏观经济波动

在地方政府债务高企的背景下,房价调控能否使资本流向非房地产部门？房价调控如果触发地方政府债务违约,宏观政策应如何应对？本文基于中国宏观经济的特征事实,引入地方政府的土地财政行为,将房价变动与地方政府的偿债能力联系起来。研究表明,由于地方政府依赖土地出让和土地抵押贷款筹集收入,房价管控导致的地价下降会带来地方政府收入的下降,直接影响地方政府的偿债能力。如果地方政府债务不出现违约,那么房价管控带来的地价下降会降低地方政府从金融部门获得的抵押融资额,使非基建部门的融资成本下降,非基建部门投资和产出上升。而如果调控房价带来的地价下降导致地方政府出现债务违约,金融部门资产受损,使金融中介减少贷款和提高贷款成本,带来整个社会的信贷紧缩,经济中各个部门的产出大幅下降。进一步的政策分析表明,有必要在避免地方政府债务违约的同时,使用财政资金补充银行资本金等多种方式稳定金融中介的资产负债表,从而将房价调控对经济的负面影响程度降到最低。

Housing Price Control,Local Government Debt and Macroeconomic Fluctuations

Since the Housing System Reform in 1998, China has experienced a sharp rise in house prices. Although rising house prices have brought a large amount of social funds and bank loans to the real estate sector, they have also prompted local governments to use land reserves to borrow large-scale loans from banks, resulting in a high level of local government debt. As house prices are strongly correlated with land prices, which are also strongly connected to the solvency of local governments, inadequate regulation of house prices is likely to trigger debt risk for local governments (Mao and Cao, 2019). This leads to two questions: can house price regulation direct funds to the manufacturing sector？ What is the link between house price regulation and local government debt risk？
By identifying the stylized facts of China's macroeconomy, we find that under the current financing mode of local governments, local government revenue depends heavily on “land finance”. Controlling house prices will reduce land prices, which in turn will affect the solvency of local governments. When local governments are unable to repay their debt or when the central government is unwilling to bail them out, local governments may default, which will have a serious negative impact on the economy through the financial system. Based on these facts, this paper builds a multi-sector DSGE model. To characterize the relationship among house prices, land finance, and local government debt, we incorporate local governments and their land finance behavior into the model. In addition, to characterize the impact of local government borrowing behavior on the financial sector, following Iacoviello (2015) and Bernanke et al. (1999), we introduce financial frictions.
The results of numerical simulations show that controlling house prices leads to a decline in land prices, which directly affects the ability of local governments to repay their debt. If the decline in land prices does not trigger local government debt default, it will have two effects: first, the decline in land prices will lead to a decline in local government revenue, which will affect local government expenditures, resulting in a decline in output in the infrastructure sector and in total output; second, the decline in local governments' mortgage lending caused by the decrease in land prices will lead to a decline in the deposit and loan premiums of the financial sector and a reduction in the cost of other sectors to obtain loans from the financial sector. This will be further amplified through the financial accelerator effect, leading to increased investment and output expansion in non-infrastructure sectors. However, if the decline in land prices triggers local government debt default, that is, local governments are unable to repay loans obtained from the financial sector and the central government is unwilling to bail them out, then default will result in a loss of assets in the financial sector. This will lead financial intermediaries to reduce loans and sharply increase their deposit and loan premiums, resulting in a sharp increase in the cost of all sectors of the economy to obtain funds, amplified by financial accelerators, and ultimately resulting in a sharp drop in investment and output in all sectors of the economy.
Further counterfactual policy analysis shows that to avoid local government default, we should use fiscal funds to supplement bank capital or reduce bank reserve ratios to reduce the deposit and loan premiums of financial intermediaries. In this way, we can avoid local government default and reduce the cost of financing in the whole economy, which will ultimately minimize the negative economic impact of house price regulation.
Compared with previous research, this article makes the following contributions. First, the problem of local government debt has always been a major concern in house price regulation. However, existing studies are mostly qualitative and not systemic. In this regard, this article builds a multi-sectoral DSGE model to describe how house prices affect local government debt and examines the key factors that determine the relationship between the two. Second, most studies of the effect of house price regulation on economic fluctuations are primarily qualitative. This article is the first to construct a multi-sector DSGE model to identify the channels through which house price regulation affects economic fluctuations from a general equilibrium perspective, and examines the role of various factors in this relationship. Finally, the question of how to stabilize house prices and direct funds to the manufacturing sector without triggering local government debt default remains unclear. By clarifying relevant ideas through model analysis, this article attempts to answer this question and offers relevant policy suggestions.