CEO任期与企业资本投资

本文基于管理者在一定约束条件下追求自身利益最大化的逻辑思路,分析管理者任期与企业资本投资之间的关系,重点检验我国上市公司CEO的既有任期和预期任期对企业投资水平和投资效率的影响。研究结果发现,在管理者任期与投资水平的关系上,国有企业与非国有企业表现一致:CEO的既有任期越长,企业的投资水平越高;CEO的预期任期越短,企业的投资水平越低。在管理者任期与投资效率的关系上,国有企业与非国有企业表现不同:非国有企业的过度投资程度与CEO的既有任期及预期任期无关,而国有企业CEO的既有任期越长,过度投资问题越严重;CEO的预期任期越短,过度投资问题越能得到缓解。

CEO Tenure and Firm Capital Investment

Based on the logic that management maximizes their own interests,this paper focuses on the relationship between CEO tenure and firm capital investment and empirically examines the influence of CEO actual tenure and expected tenure on investment level and investment efficiency for the Chinese listed companies.The results indicate that,both for state - owned - enterprises(SOEs) and non - state - owned - enterprises (NSOEs),the longer the CEO actual tenure,the larger the amount of firm investment and the shorter the CEO expected tenure,the smaller the amount of firm investment.As for investment efficiency,SOEs exhibit that the longer the CEO actual tenure,the more severe the firm overinvestment,and the shorter the CEOs expected tenure, the less severe the firms overinvestment,but for NSOEs,neither CEO actual tenure nor expected tenure is related to overinvestment.