合理掏空动机、超额掏空动机与控制权私有收益

以2004—2007年我国上市公司为样本，实证研究结果发现：（1）控股股东的”合理掏空动机”与”超额掏空动机”伴随着现金流权的上升呈现的是一种此消彼长的关系，而这两类动机都会引致控股股东对于控制权私有收益的追逐，但是二者的作用机理却是完全不同的；（2）伴随着现金流权的影响，控股股东的”超额掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的正向效应和”合理掏空动机”之于控制权私有收益的负向效应的综合作用结果是不同的。

Reasonable Tunneling Motivation,Over Tunneling Motivation and Private Benefits of Control

By using a sample of 2004-2007 on China＇s listed companies, it is found that：l. Along with the rise of inwvolving degree of controlling Shareholder, the ＂reasonable tunneling motivation＂ and ＂over tunneling motivation＂ showed a kind of reciprocal relationship. Both of the motivations will lead to the chase for private benefits of control, but the mechanism of action is completely different.2. Along with the different involving degrees of controlling shareholder, the comprehensive result from the positive effect of ＂over tunneling motivation＂ and the negative effect of ＂reasonable tunneling motivation＂ are differenh