Ownership Concentration in Privatized Firms: The Role of Disclosure Standards, Auditor Choice, and Auditing Infrastructure

We rely on a unique data set to estimate the impact of disclosure standards and auditor‐related characteristics on ownership concentration in 190 privatized firms from 31 countries. Accounting transparency can help alleviate the agency conflict between minority investors and controlling shareholders, which is evident in the extent of ownership concentration, since the expropriation of corporate resources hinges on these private benefits remaining hidden. After controlling for other country‐level and firm‐level determinants, we find weak (no) evidence that extensive disclosure standards (auditor choice) reduce ownership concentration. In contrast, we report strong, robust evidence that ownership concentration is lower in countries with securities laws that specify a lower burden of proof in civil and criminal litigation against auditors, consistent with Ball's 2001] predictions. Collectively, our research implies that minority investors worldwide value legal institutions that discipline auditors in the event of financial reporting failure over both the presence of a Big 5 auditor and better disclosure standards. Re‐estimating our regressions on a broad sample of western European public firms provides similar evidence on all of our predictions.