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商业银行高管薪酬业绩敏感度的实证研究
引用本文:徐勇.商业银行高管薪酬业绩敏感度的实证研究[J].济南金融,2009(4):20-24.
作者姓名:徐勇
作者单位:山东大学经济学院;
摘    要:本文基于调查数据,实证分析了银行绩效对高管薪酬的影响,并对银行高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响因素进行了分析。结果发现,样本银行高管薪酬与银行绩效之间显著负相关,股权集中、银行风险和银行规模也影响了银行高管薪酬的决定;股权集中和银行风险强化了银行高管薪酬与绩效之间的敏感度,而股权制衡则弱化了薪酬绩效敏感度。

关 键 词:高管薪酬  银行绩效  薪酬绩效敏感度

An Empirical Analysis of the Sensitivity between Executives' Compensation and Commercial Bank's Performance
Xu Yong.An Empirical Analysis of the Sensitivity between Executives' Compensation and Commercial Bank's Performance[J].Jinan Finance,2009(4):20-24.
Authors:Xu Yong
Abstract:This paper analyzes how the performance affects the compensation of executives in commercial banks according to the data from the investigation,and studies some factors that influence the sensitivity.Overall,we find that there is a significant negative relation between the salary incentive for the executives of banks and the performance,at the same time,ownership concentration,risk and scale of banks influence the executives' compensation of banks.Ownership concentration and risk strengthen the sensitivity,...
Keywords:executives' compensation  bank performance  the sensitivity of the executives' compensation and performance  
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