谁更关心关键审计事项:管理层还是分析师

学术界对披露关键审计事项能否提高审计报告的信息含量展开了大量的研究,但主要集中于对股票市场信息传递的探讨,鲜有文献从管理层行为的角度考察披露关键审计事项对资本市场的影响。本文利用新审计报告的过渡期设定,以实施新审计报告准则对分析师预测准确度的影响为切入点,考察了披露关键审计事项究竟是作为增量信息改进分析师预测,还是作为监督压力抑制管理层迎合分析师预测的行为。研究结果支持监督效应,但这种监督效应存在局部性和补充性,即只能对管理层在薪酬激励较低和权力受到制衡的情境下发挥作用;且仅能对管理层在审计质量较低、利润操纵事项难以分辨的情境下发挥补充监督作用。这些结论为监管者和政策制定者完善审计准则提供了些许借鉴。

Who Cares More about Key Audit Matters:Management or Analyst

There have been numerous studies on whether disclosing Key Audit Matters can improve the information content of audit reports.However,the discussions mainly focus on information transmission in the stock market,and there is little literature on the impact of Key Audit Matters disclosure on capital markets from the perspective of management behavior.Based on the transitional setting of the new audit report and the impact of the implementation of the new audit reporting standards on the accuracy of analyst forecasts,this paper investigates whether the disclosure of Key Audit Matters improves analyst forecasts as incremental information or restrains the behavior of management to meet analyst forecasts as a result of supervisory pressure.The results support the existence of supervision effect,but this supervisory effect is partial and complementary,which means that it can only play a role in the management with lower compensation incentives or the management with sufficient power balance.Moreover,it can only play a supplementary supervisory role for the management in the context of low audit quality or indistinguishable profit manipulation.These conclusions provide reference for regulators and policymakers to improve auditing standards.