企业融资结构理论与我国上市公司融资行为分析

企业融资理应以企业价值最大化为宗旨,这也是西方融资结构理论的立论根据.而我国上市公司特殊的股本结构导致真正的股东对公司失去控制.本文通过对国家股、法人股和中小股股东目标的分析发现,其股东目标的具体体现都不是公司价值最大化,这导致了我国上市公司融资决策与西方融资结构理论相悖.股权融资偏好是内部控制人自身成本收益分析的必然结果,因此,必须通过股权改革形成真正的产权主体,激活资本市场竞争机制,通过经理人优胜劣汰机制和激励机制的有效运转实现对经理人的激励.当公司价值最大化成为委托人和代理人的共同目标时,企业的融资行为必然回归理性.

Analysis of the Theory of Enterprise Financing Structure and Financing Behavior of China's Listed Companies

Enterprise financing should be targeted at achieving maximum enterprise value.This is also the theory base of financing struc-ture in the west.However,due to the special equity structure of public companies in our country,real shareholders are out of control of the company.Analysis of the objectives of holders of state shares and legal person shares as well as public investors shows that they do not aim at maximization of enterprise value.This fact puts the policy-making of our listed companies at variance with the theory of financing struc-ture in the west.Equity financing inclination is an inevitable outcome resulting from self-analysis of cost-benefit by the internal controllers.Therefore,equity reform must be carried out so that the real equity investors are brought into place and competitive mechanism of capital market is activated.To stimulate managers to work harder,the principle of the survival of the fittest must be applied and an incentive mechanism must be effectively operated.When maximization of enterprise value becomes the common goal of both clients and agents,fi-nancing behavior of an enterprise will surely be rationalized.