中小企业银行融资方案的新型设计 --"关系贷款"及"银行辛迪加和相机治理"

本文旨在从信息不对称造成信贷配给的角度为中小企业融资难问题提供一种解决方案。欧美等成熟市场经济国家通过银企建立稳定的交易关系来消除两者之间的信息不对称,提高贷款可得性;青木昌彦的银行辛迪加和相机治理模式的突出特点在于组建辛迪加,加强牵头行对企业贷款的事中和事后监督。本文吸收两者的优点并结合我国的实际情况,提出了我国中小企业银行融资的模式:企业向银行申请贷款之前必须与其有稳定的交易关系,以便银行进行有效的事前监督;银行一旦接受贷款申请,即可作为牵头行来组建银行辛迪加,集中借款企业与辛迪加成员的交易信息,并承担全部的事中和事后监督责任;一旦企业出现财务危机,牵头行负责大部分债务的偿还。

New Design of Financing Plan for SMS Enterprises to Seek Loans from Banks--relationship-based loan and managing and controlling on choice by bank syndicate

This paper is intended to provide a solution to the financing bottleneck encountered by SMS enterprises from the perspective ofunfair credit ration caused by information asymmetry between SMS firms and banks. In fully developed market- economy countries in thewest, such asymmetry is removed by cementing stable business relationship between enterprises and banks, making loans easily available.One outstanding feature of managing and controlling on choice by bank syndicate" model built up by AOKI Masahiko" is to tighten controlover loans extended to enterprises during and after the transactions by establishing syndicates. With good points of these two theories drawnupon and in consideration of the reality in our country, a model for SMS enterprises to seek loans from banks is proposed, which states thatan enterprise should have stable business relationship with banks before applying for loans; a bank should establish a bank syndicate once itaccepts the loan application, collect transaction information between the loanees and syndicate members, be responsible for supervision dur-ing and after the deal and be ready to pay most of debt in case an enterprise is hit by financial crisis.