Market making with discrete prices |
| |
Authors: | Anshuman VR; Kalay A |
| |
Institution: | Tel Aviv University, University of Utah, USA
z Corresponding author at: Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, India 560 076 |
| |
Abstract: | Exchange-mandated discrete pricing restrictions create a wedgebetween the underlying equilibrium price and the observed price.This wedge permits a competitive market maker to realize economicprofits that could help recoup fixed costs. The optimal ticksize that maximizes the expected profits of the market makercan equal to $1/8 for reasonable parameter values. The optimaltick size is decreasing in the degree of adverse selection.Discreteness per se can cause time-varying bid-ask spreads,asymmetric commissions, and market breakdowns. Discreteness,which imposes additional transaction costs, reduces the valueof private information. Liquidity traders can benefit undercertain conditions. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 Oxford 等数据库收录! |
|