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博弈论视角下公估人的理性选择及外部约束
引用本文:李艳.博弈论视角下公估人的理性选择及外部约束[J].保险研究,2011(7):100-104.
作者姓名:李艳
作者单位:广东金融学院,广东广州,510521
摘    要:保险公估人是保险业发展不可缺少的重要组成部分,但“公估不公”始终是公估行业发展中的一个难题。作为一种典型的承揽关系,保险人与公估人之间存在着信息不对称,以及由此带来的道德风险。本文从博弈论的角度,构建公估人和保险人之间的策略型博弈,通过求解纳什均衡发现,公估人的理性选择并不总是诚实公正。因此,只有加强外部约束,才能实现...

关 键 词:保险公估人  保险人  策略型博弈  纳什均衡

Insurance adjusters' rational choice and external constraints based on game theory
Li Yan.Insurance adjusters' rational choice and external constraints based on game theory[J].Insurance Studies,2011(7):100-104.
Authors:Li Yan
Abstract:The industry of insurance adjusters is an important and indispensable part of the insurance market,but "unfair adjustment" is always the problem in the development of the insurance adjusters.The relationship between the adjusters and insurer is a typical contract relationship,which results in the asymmetric information and moral hazard.From the game theory perspective,this paper tried to build a strategy game between the adjuster and insurer and solve the Nash equilibrium.We found out adjusters′ rational choice was not always honest and impartial,so strengthening the external constraints may help to realize positive interaction between adjusters and insurers.
Keywords:insurance adjusters  insurers  strategy game  Nash Equilibrium  
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