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混合供给模式下巨灾保险市场的激励与约束研究
引用本文:高海霞,王学冉.混合供给模式下巨灾保险市场的激励与约束研究[J].保险研究,2012(6):83-88.
作者姓名:高海霞  王学冉
作者单位:西南财经大学保险学院
摘    要:巨灾保险具有准公共物品属性,既可以由政府提供,也可以由市场提供,单纯依靠政府和私人市场提供都存在较大弊端,政府和私人部门合作,采用混合供给模式可以形成互补优势,提高效率,这已成为国际巨灾保险市场发展的一大趋势。本文以混合供给模式下的巨灾保险市场为对象,分析巨灾保险市场中的委托代理关系,并对如何构建有效的激励与约束机制进行了初步探讨。

关 键 词:巨灾保险市场  混合供给模式  委托代理问题  激励与约束

The Research on Incentives and Constraints of the Catastrophe Insurance Market under the Mixed Supply Mode
Gao Hai-xia,Zhuo Zhi,Wang Xue-ran.The Research on Incentives and Constraints of the Catastrophe Insurance Market under the Mixed Supply Mode[J].Insurance Studies,2012(6):83-88.
Authors:Gao Hai-xia  Zhuo Zhi  Wang Xue-ran
Institution:(School of Insurance of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu Sichuan 611130)
Abstract:Catastrophe insurance has the properties of quasi-public goods.It can be provided by the government or by the market.However,there exists large drawbacks if relying solely on government or private market.The major development trend in the international catastrophe insurance market is to adopt the mixed supply model of government and private sector cooperation which can combine complementary strengths of each party and improve efficiency.This paper analyzed the principal-agent relationship in the catastrophic insurance market under the mixed supply model,and also discussed how to build an effective incentive and restriction mechanism.
Keywords:catastrophe insurance market  mixed supply model  principal-agent problem  incentive and restriction
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