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保险市场逆向选择的信号传递博弈研究
引用本文:朱曙光,锁凌燕.保险市场逆向选择的信号传递博弈研究[J].保险研究,2011(11):89-97.
作者姓名:朱曙光  锁凌燕
作者单位:北京大学经济学院,北京,100871;北京大学经济学院,北京,100871
摘    要:在保险市场中,投保人比保险人更了解自己的风险状况,保险双方之间的这种信息不对称难以避免地会产生逆向选择问题,于是在保险人混同定价的情形下,低风险投保人要承受过高的费率而受损,高风险投保人因保险成本过低而削弱控制风险的激励,导致整个市场资源配置低效甚至因逆向选择螺旋而崩溃。通过引入信号传递机制来实现保险市场的分离定价,从...

关 键 词:保险市场  逆向选择  信号传递  博弈  分离均衡

Analysis of Adverse Selection under the Framework of Signaling Model
Zhu Shu-guang,Suo Ling-yan.Analysis of Adverse Selection under the Framework of Signaling Model[J].Insurance Studies,2011(11):89-97.
Authors:Zhu Shu-guang  Suo Ling-yan
Institution:Zhu Shu-guang,Suo Ling-yan
Abstract:In the insurance market,the policyholder knows his own risk conditions better than the insurer.Such information asymmetry unavoidably results in an adverse selection: under a mixed pricing strategy,the low-risk policyholder bears the loss due to a relatively high cost while the high-risk policyholder loses the incentive to control his risk due to a relatively low cost,leading to an inefficient allocation of resources and even an adverse selection spiral followed by a market crash.This paper delt with the problem of adverse selection and provided a method of separate pricing by introducing a signaling mechanism.By analyzing the signaling model,the author offered a stable equilibrium solution under the special condition and the corresponding suggestions.
Keywords:insurance market  adverse selection  signaling transfer  game  separate equilibrium
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