Education policy and tax competition with imperfect student and labor mobility |
| |
Authors: | Tim Krieger Thomas Lange |
| |
Institution: | (1) School of Management and Marketing, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, QLD, 4350, Australia;(2) The University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, 1142, New Zealand |
| |
Abstract: | This paper analyzes the effect of increasing human-capital mobility—i.e. student and labor mobility—on net tax revenues when
revenue-maximizing governments compete for human capital by means of income tax rates and amenities offered to students (positive
expenditure) or rather tuition fees (negative expenditure). An increase in labor mobility implies neither an intensified tax
competition nor an erosion of revenues. In fact, the equilibrium tax rate even increases in labor mobility. Amenities offered
to students are non-monotonically related to labor mobility; overall, net revenues increase with labor mobility. An increase
in student mobility, however, erodes revenues, mainly due to intensified tax competition. A concurrent cutback in expenditures
mitigates this erosion but cannot fully prevent it. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|