Suppressing resistance to low-skill migration |
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Authors: | Assaf Razin Efraim Sadka |
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Institution: | (1) Research Department, International Monetary Fund, 15-12-906, 700 19th St. N.W., 20431 Washington, D.C., USA |
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Abstract: | Just like any other trade activity, migration tends to generate gains to all parties involved, the migrants as well as the native population, if markets are well-functioning. But typically these gains tend to be rather small. However, when the labor market is mal-functioning, migration may exacerbate the imperfections in the market. Consequently, it could lead to losses to the host-country population, which can be quite sizable.An additional problem raised by migration is the toll it imposes on the welfare state. As a democracy, the host-country cannot exclude migrants from various entilement programs and public services. As a consequence, the modern welfare state could find it more and more costly to run its various programs when they attract low-income migrants.These considerations may help explain why there is strong resistance to migration. Consequently, to be able to benefit from migration, one may want to improve the functioning of the markets (with a compensation to wage earners that compete with unskilled migrants) and to downsize the scope of the state entitlement programs.The current version was prepared while the first author was visiting the Research Department and the second author was visiting the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund. |
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Keywords: | Migration and the welfare state rigid wages human capital |
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