Tender Offers and Free Cash Flow: An Empirical Analysis |
| |
| Authors: | Robert C Hanson |
| |
| Institution: | San Diego State University, San Diego, CA 92182. The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. An earlier, and substantially different, version of this paper was presented at the 1989 Financial Management Association annual meeting. The author thanks the session participants, especially Wayne Marr, for their comments. |
| |
| Abstract: | High free cash flow firms are characterized by a mismatch between growth opportunities and resources. High free cash flow target firms receive higher-than-average abnormal returns. Target returns are lower when the bidder is a high free cash flow firm. During the 1970s, results suggested that cash-flow-rich bidding firms pursued low-benefit takeovers. During the 1980s, high free cash flow firms became the targets of tender offers. Results are consistent with the notion that reducing agency problems in target firms generates benefits and that bidding firms with large free cash flow undertake low-benefit acquisitions. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
|
|
