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The impact of an independent inspectorate on penal governance,performance and accountability: Pressure points and conflict “in the pursuit of an ideal of perfection”
Authors:Linda M English
Institution:1. Professor of Accounting, Royal Holloway, University of London, United Kingdom;2. Emeritus Professor, University of Roehampton, United Kingdom;1. Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia;2. Umm Al-Qura University, Makkah City, Saudi Arabia;3. Alfaisal University, Jeddah City, Saudi Arabia;1. UniKL Business School, Universiti Kuala Lumpur;2. Accounting Research Institute, Universiti Teknologi MARA Shah Alam, Malaysia;3. Faculty of Accountancy, Universiti Teknologi MARA, Puncak Alam, Malaysia;1. Alliance Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, Manchester M15 6PB, United Kingdom;2. Durham University Business School, University of Durham, Durham DH1 3LB, United Kingdom;3. Sheffield University Management School, University of Sheffield, Sheffield S10 1FL, United Kingdom;1. PSB, Paris School of Business, 59 rue Nationale, 75013 Paris, France;2. ESCP Europe, 79 avenue de la République, 75011 Paris, France;1. University of Tampere, School of Management, University of Tampere, Tampere FI-33014, Finland;2. Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand;3. University of Central Florida, United States
Abstract:This paper examines the impact of an independent Inspectorate on the enactment, of and accountability for, penal reform in the Australian State of Western Australia. Intended to improve system wide custodial outcomes through the introduction of a privately managed operator acting as standard bearer and innovator, the reform agenda was predicated on an overhaul of governance, performance, systems and reporting practices in the sponsoring department and the state's public prison network. Insights from three credos of imprisonment, theorizations of ‘hierarchical’ and ‘intelligent’ governance and accountability, the interplay of values in changing practice, and the ways in which inspectors establish particular inspection regimes, frame analysis of reform implementation and the inspection regime in action over a ten year period. Using archival material, this research examines how the Inspectorate, in making things auditable, altered perceptions and organizational realities of a network of actors. It is contended that the governance and accountability tensions inherent in managerialism, exemplified in its reliance on ‘neutral’ accounting technologies to incentivise, manage and monitor custodial outcomes, privilege instrumental hierarchical governance and accountability regimes that ignore the rehabilitative aspects of imprisonment. Further, conflicting publicly espoused and privately held values play vital roles in moulding performance in a penal setting, and are fundamental to changing outcomes in networks. The Inspectorate's public values and intelligent accountability regime resonate with the Department's policy objectives and public values, but are shown to have been initially inconsistent with network actors’ hidden private values. The research concludes that the appointment of an independent Inspectorate has facilitated the accountability of those responsible for prison quality and positively influenced the treatment of prisoners. A secondary concern is investigating conflicting propositions about the relative governance, performance and accountability of privately and publicly operated prisons.
Keywords:Governance  Intelligent accountability  Performance  Penal reform  New public management  Public sector  Values  Privatization
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