首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Suspension of Convertibility versus Deposit Insurance: A Welfare Comparison
Authors:Margarita Samartín
Institution:(1) Departamento de Economía de la Empresa, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Calle Madrid 126, 28903 Getafe, Spain
Abstract:This paper introduces risk-averse preferences in Chariand Jagannathan (1988). A first motivation for thisextension is to give a positive role for a financial intermediaryin the economy, who offers risk-sharing contracts to liquidityseeking individuals. In this framework, both information-inducedan pure panic runs will occur. The second motivation is tocomplete Chari and Jagannathan's welfare analysis by comparingsuspension of convertibility and deposit insurance, given theirrelative benefits and costs (of randomization in meeting liquidityneeds or deadweight taxation). It is shown that the choice betweenthe two contracts depends on the level of risk aversion, theintertemporal discount factor and the attributes about theunderlying technology.
Keywords:bank runs  deposit contracts  deposit insurance  optimal risk sharing  suspension of convertibility
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号