An Examination of Multiple Governance Forces within Bank Holding Companies |
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Authors: | Gregory E Sierra Eli Talmor James S Wallace |
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Institution: | (1) Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, USA;(2) London Business School, UK;(3) Claremont Graduate University, 1021 N. Dartmouth Ave, Claremont, CA 91711, USA |
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Abstract: | This study explores multiple means of governance and monitoring in bank holding companies and their impact on performance
and executive compensation. We exploit variables unique to the banking industry to aid in our understanding of this simultaneous
relationship. Our primary finding is that after controlling for both regulatory oversight and capital market discipline, a
strong board is associated with higher firm performance, lower levels of executive pay and lower growth rates of executive
pay. The findings support the fundamental role of corporate governance in overseeing management and ultimately firm performance. |
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Keywords: | Bank holding companies Executive compensation Corporate governance Firm performance |
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