Corporate governance and recent consolidation in the banking industry |
| |
| Institution: | 1. University of L''Aquila, Department of Industrial and Information Engineering and Economics, Via Gronchi 18, 67100 L''Aquila, Italy;2. Polytechnic University of Milan, Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Engineering, Via Lambruschini 4/b, 20156 Milan, Italy;1. Department of Finance, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan;2. Beedie School of Business, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, BC, Canada;1. Milgard School of Business, University of Washington Tacoma, Tacoma, WA 98402, United States;2. College of Business, Florida International University, Miami, FL United States;3. College of Business, University of Nevada, Reno, NV 89503, United States |
| |
| Abstract: | Using the universe of publicly traded banks at year-end 1993, we find that target banks' outside directors, but not inside directors, tend to own more stock than their counterparts in other banks. Having an outside blockholder is also associated with banks becoming targets. In contrast to existing research on industrial firms, board structure does not help determine which sample banks sell. Neither the fraction of outsiders on a bank's board nor having an outside-dominated board differentiate the target banks in our sample. Instead, outside directors/shareholders and blockholders appear to be primarily responsible for encouraging bank managers to accept an attractive merger offer |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
