Judicial independence and corporate innovation: Evidence from the establishment of circuit courts |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Finance, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, China;2. School of Management, Shandong University, China;3. School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, New Zealand;1. Central Bank of Chile, Agustinas 118, 8340454 Santiago, Chile;2. Hunter College & Graduate Center, City University of New York, 695 Park Ave, New York NY 10065, United States;1. Department of Finance, NUS Business School, National University of Singapore, 15 Kent Ridge Drive, BIZ 1 #7-63, 119245, Singapore;2. Department of Accounting, School of Economics and Management, Beihang University, 37 Xueyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing, 100191, P.R. China;3. Division of Accounting, Nanyang Business School, Nanyang Technological University, 50 Nanyang Avenue, 639798, Singapore;1. KU Leuven and CEPR, Belgium;2. KU Leuven, Belgium |
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| Abstract: | This study explores the effects of judicial independence on corporate innovation by analyzing the staggered establishment of Circuit Courts in China. We find that introducing Circuit Courts increases corporate innovation, particularly for central state-owned enterprises and private firms. Channel analysis shows that Circuit Courts significantly reduce local judicial protectionism, ease financial constraints, and improve corporate governance, which stimulates innovation. The positive effects of Circuit Courts are more pronounced in cities facing severe political intervention, regions with weak legal environments, and private firms without political or banking connections. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns, alternative measures and specification models. Overall, this study supports the theoretical arguments that institutions matter and that improvements in judicial quality boost firms' incentives to innovate. |
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