Internal controls,risk management,and cash holdings |
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| Institution: | 1. School of Business Management, NMIMS, Navi Mumbai, India;2. Indian Institute of Management Raipur, India;1. Shanghai Advanced Institute of Finance, Shanghai Jiaotong University, Shanghai, China;2. Henry B. Tippie College of Business, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, United States;1. Manning School of Business, University of Massachusetts Lowell, 72 University Avenue, Lowell, MA 01854, United States of America;2. Robert C. Vackar College of Business & Entrepreneurship, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, 1201 W University Dr, Edinburg, TX 78539, United States of America;3. School of Industrial Management, Ho Chi Minh University of Technology, Vietnam National University – Ho Chi Minh City, 268 Ly Thuong Kiet Street, District 10, Ho Chi Minh City, Viet Nam;4. School of Business, University of Connecticut, 2100 Hillside Road, Storrs, CT 06269, United States of America |
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| Abstract: | Exploiting a unique setting in China where internal controls are intended to manage risks, we investigate how internal controls shape the cash holding policies. Results show that firms with higher internal control quality (ICQ) are less likely to have abnormal cash holdings, either excess or deficit cash, and this effect is not driven by corporate governance quality. We also find that firms with higher ICQ are more likely to increase dividend payments and are less likely to increase M&A investments, especially when the firms have had a negative experience with prior M&A investments. Furthermore, our tests on the market valuation of cash holdings show that investors place a higher value on cash holdings of firms with higher ICQ. Collectively, our findings suggest that internal controls help companies shape reasonable cash policies that lead to value creation. |
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