The influence of firm- and manager-specific characteristics on the structure of executive compensation |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Edwin L. Cox School of Business, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0333, United States;2. Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth, TX 76109, United States;1. Fisher School of Business, Ohio State University, 840 Fisher Hall, 2100 Neil Ave, Columbus OH 43210, USA;2. W.P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA;3. John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University, Campus Box 1133, 1 Brookings Dr, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | We analyze the influence of firm and managerial characteristics on executive compensation. Consistent with theory, we find monitoring difficulties result in greater use of options while CEO and blockholder ownership result in less. Risky investment is positively related to options and negatively related to cash bonus and restricted stock, suggesting that firms use options to encourage managers to take risks. We find a negative (positive) relation between options and leverage (convertible debt) consistent with minimizing the agency costs of debt. Finally, we provide new evidence on managerial horizon and incentives, documenting a concave relation between cash bonus and CEO age. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 ScienceDirect 等数据库收录！ |
|
