中央银行独立性:一个新政治经济学分析框架

中央银行独立性是中央银行制度建设的基础与理论探讨的焦点，许多机构或学者从不同角度予以分析论证。新政治经济学关于中央银行独立性的研究已经形成丰富的理论资源，诸如政治周期理论、时间非一致性理论及公共选择理论对于中央银行制度建设具有重要的学术价值。

Analysis of Central Bank Independence under the Frame of New Political Economics

Central bank independence is the systematical foundation and theoretical focus of central bank. Many institutions or scholars have analyzed and commented from different angles. New political economics has rich theoretical resources about the central bank independence, such as the Political Business Cycles Theory, Dynamic Inconsistency Theory and Public Choice Theory. These theories have great academic value to the central bank system.