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Market Valuation and Equity Ownership Structure: The Case of Agency Conflict Regimes
Authors:PantzaliS  Christos  Francis KIM  Chansog  Kim  Sungsoo
Institution:(1) Department of Finance, College of Business Administration, University of South Florida, 4202 East Fowler Avenue, Tampa, FL, 33620-5500;(2) Department of Accounting and Information Systems, Queens College of C.U.N.Y, 65-30 Kissena Blvd, Flushing, NY, 11367;(3) Department of Accounting, School of Business, Rutgers University, Camden, NJ, 08102
Abstract:This paper provides further evidence on the link between the firm's performance and the distribution of the common shares between insiders, blockholders and institutions. We endogenize the functional form of the market valuecommon equity structure relationship by using a switching regression methodology. This allows us to observe four distinct ownership structure types that constitute different agency conflict regimes. We provide evidence that supports the notion that investors recognize the existence of such regimes and assess market values differently depending on the type of agency regime the firm operates in. We find that firms with low insider stakes and low blockholder stakes and firms with high insider stakes and high blockholder stakes have the highest agency costs of free cash flow. We also find that the effect of the ownership variables on market values differs across regimes and that there are differences in the monitoring effectiveness of institutional holders and blockholders.
Keywords:ownership structure  market value  agency conflict
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