Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover |
| |
| Authors: | David W Blackwell Donna M Dudney Kathleen A Farrell |
| |
| Institution: | (1) Department of Finance, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University, 4218 TAMU, College Station, TX 77845-4218, USA;(2) Department of Finance, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0490, USA |
| |
| Abstract: | We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing
CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants.
The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest
that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance
is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing
forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associated
with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in operating income is positively associated with
an increase in new stock grants for the incoming relative to the outgoing CEO.
|
| |
| Keywords: | Executive compensation CEO turnover Compensation structure Firm performance |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
