Earnings Preannouncement Strategies |
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| Authors: | Soffer Leonard C Thiagarajan S Ramu Walther Beverly R |
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| Institution: | (1) Department of Accounting and Information Systems, Northwestern University, Leverone Hall, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL, 60208-2002;(2) Mellon Capital Management Corporation, 595 Market Street, San Francisco, CA, 94105 |
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| Abstract: | We examine the disclosure strategies managers follow when theyd  preannounce quarterly earnings shortly before formal earnings announcements. We document that managers with bad news release essentially all of their news at the preannouncement date, while managers with good news only release about half of their news. Controlling for the combined news released at the preannouncement and earnings announcement dates, firms with negative earnings announcement surprises have significantly lower excess returns for the period from just before the preannouncement to just after the earnings announcement. This finding is consistent with the observed disclosure strategies whereby managers attempt to avoid negative earnings announcement surprises, and suggests that how information is presented can affect the market's reaction to that information. |
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| Keywords: | Preannouncements Earnings Announcements Disclosure Market Reaction |
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