首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Screening equilibria in experimental markets
Authors:Lisa L Posey  Abdullah Yavas
Institution:(1) Penn State University, Business Building, University Park, PA 16802, USA
Abstract:We conduct an experimental test of a screening model of an insurance market with asymmetric information. We first conduct three sessions in which the proportion of high risk buyers is such that a separating equilibrium should exist. We then conduct three more sessions in which the only change we make is decreasing the proportion of high risks such that the equilibrium is now a pooling equilibrium. In both treatments, the observed behavior converges to the equilibrium prediction.
Contact Information Abdullah YavasEmail:
Keywords:Screening equilibrium  Experiments
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号