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机构投资者的治理角色——过度投资视角
引用本文:叶建芳,赵胜男,李丹蒙.机构投资者的治理角色——过度投资视角[J].证券市场导报,2012(5):27-35.
作者姓名:叶建芳  赵胜男  李丹蒙
作者单位:上海财经大学会计与财务研究院;光大证券股份有限公司;中欧国际工商学院
摘    要:本文以2007~2009年我国上市公司的过度投资行为为背景,考察机构投资者持股对过度投资的治理角色。研究结果表明,机构的期末持股比例、长线型机构投资者尤其是长线型基金与过度投资显著负相关,表现为有效监督者的角色;短线型机构投资者则缺乏公司治理的意愿和动机,表现为利益攫取者的角色。研究结果意味着,我国的机构投资者同时具备有效监督者和利益攫取者的角色,何时表现出何种角色取决于持股比例以及持股时间。

关 键 词:过度投资  机构投资者  有效监督者  利益攫取者

The Governance Role of Institutional Investors with the Perspective of Over-Investment
Ye Jianfang,Zhao Shengnan,Li Danmeng.The Governance Role of Institutional Investors with the Perspective of Over-Investment[J].Securities Market Herald,2012(5):27-35.
Authors:Ye Jianfang  Zhao Shengnan  Li Danmeng
Institution:Ye Jianfang,Zhao Shengnan,Li Danmeng
Abstract:This paper examines institutional investors’ role in corporate governance of over-investment on the basis of over-investment listed companies from 2007 to 2009.The result shows that long-term institutional investors have a significant negative correlation with over-investment.Especially in long-term fund,the inhibition effect is more apparent.We also find that institutional investors act as an effective watchdog’s role.Short-term institutional investors are lack of motivations for governance,so they are more likely to grab the interest.The different roles of institutional investors depend on shareholding ratio and shareholding time.
Keywords:over-investment  institutional investors  effective supervisor  interest grabbers
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