投票权重向创业团队的倾斜配置及股权结构设计

股权结构设计和控制权安排是协调股东与经理人代理冲突的基础性公司治理制度安排。"同股不同权"构架的核心是通过投票权重配置向创业团队倾斜,实现创业团队与外部投资者之间从短期雇佣合约到长期合伙合约的转化。上述构架由于顺应了以互联网技术为标志的第四次工业革命对创新导向的企业权威重新配置的内在要求,而受到诸多高科技企业青睐。"一股一票"并非对投资者利益最好的保护,"同股不同权"也并非对投资者利益最不好的保护,投资者自愿购买"同股不同权"构架股票,并未从根本上动摇股东处于公司治理权威地位的"股东中心主义"。与现实需求相契合,"同股不同权"的股权结构设计中,应遵循资金投入要求、日落条款设置及股东权威性不变等设计理念。

The Incline of Voting Right Allocation Weight and Equity Structure Design to Entrepreneur Team

The design of ownership structure and the arrangement of control right are the basic arrangements of corporate governance system to coordinate the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers. The core of "different rights of the same shares" framework is to realize the transformation from short-term employment contract to long-term partnership contract between the entrepreneurial team and external investors by inclining the weight of voting right allocation to the entrepreneurial team. The above framework is favored by many high-tech enterprises in the design of equity structure because it conforms to the inherent requirements of the fourth industrial revolution marked by internet technology for the reallocation of innovation oriented enterprise authority. The structure of "different rights of same shares" based on investors’ willingness to invest has not fundamentally shaken the shareholder centrism that regards shareholders as the authority of corporate governance. Therefore, the "different rights of the same shares" is not the worst protection for the interests of investors, and "one share, one vote" is not the best protection for the interests of investors.