高管连锁、同业监督与公司违规

本文选取2011—2018年度A股上市公司为研究样本,以具有竞争关系的同业公司间的高管连锁作为同业监督的渠道,检验了同业监督对目标公司违规的影响。研究发现:(1)同业监督能有效抑制目标公司违规倾向,且这一影响当且仅当连锁公司是同业公司时存在;(2)同业竞争是同业监督的基础,在行业集中度低和行业增长率低的行业中,同业监督对目标公司违规的抑制作用更强;(3)目标公司的政治关联会瓦解同业监督对公司违规的抑制作用;(4)区分违规行为类型后发现,同业监督对经营违规的抑制作用最强,对信息披露违规次之,对领导人违规几乎没有效果。本研究丰富了公司违规监督机制的内容,也提供了辩证看待高管同业兼任的新视角。

Executive Interlock,Peer Monitoring and Corporate Fraud

Using the sample of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2018,this paper takes the executive interlock between peer companies(from the same industry)as the channel of peer monitoring,and investigates the influence of peer monitoring on the focal company’s fraud tendency.The results show that:(1)Peer monitoring is effective in inhibiting fraud tendency of the focal company,and this effect exists if and only if its interlocked companies are peers.(2)Industry competition is the foundation of peer monitoring,and peer monitoring’s effect is more pronounced in low-concentration industry and low-growth-rate industry.(3)The political connection of the focal company weakens the inhibitory effect of peer monitoring on corporate fraud.(4)When fraud behaviors are classified,it is found that peer monitoring is more effective on operation fraud,and then disclosure fraud,but not on leadership fraud.This research enriches the works on the monitoring mechanism for corporate fraud,and provides a dialectical view for executives concurrently serving in peer companies.