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高管薪酬:激励还是自利?——来自中国上市公司的证据
引用本文:吴育辉,吴世农.高管薪酬:激励还是自利?——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].会计研究,2010(11).
作者姓名:吴育辉  吴世农
基金项目:国家自然科学基金重点项目资助
摘    要:近年来中国上市公司的高管薪酬增长迅速并引起社会的广泛关注。本文收集了2004-2008年中国上市公司前三名高管的薪酬水平,考察高管薪酬与公司绩效、高管控制权、政府管制及代理成本之间的关系。研究发现:(1)高管薪酬仅与ROA显著正相关,但与资产获现率(经营净现金/总资产)及股票收益率没有显著的正相关关系。(2)高管的薪酬水平随着其控制权的增加而显著提高。(3)对比国有公司,非国有公司的高管更容易利用其控制权来提高自身的薪酬水平。(4)高管高薪并未有效降低公司的代理成本,反而提高了代理成本。本文的研究结果证实了我国上市公司的高管在其薪酬制定中存在明显的自利行为,且这种自利行为降低或者消除了薪酬的激励作用。

关 键 词:高管薪酬  绩效薪酬敏感度  管理层激励  管理层自利行为  公司治理

Executive Compensation:Incentives or Self-Interests?——Evidence from Listed Firms in China
Wu Yuhui,Wu Shinong.Executive Compensation:Incentives or Self-Interests?——Evidence from Listed Firms in China[J].Accounting Research,2010(11).
Authors:Wu Yuhui  Wu Shinong
Abstract:Executive compensation of listed firms in China has been increasing dramatically in recent years.Using data from listed firms from 2004 to 2008,this paper investigates and examines pay-performance sensitivity,effect of managerial power on executive compensation,different effects of managerial power on executive compensation between state-owned firms and non-state-owned firms,and relationship between executive compensation and agency costs.We find that:(1) Although executive compensation is significantly positively related with ROA,there is no evidence showing that executive compensation has significantly positive relation with operating net cash flow or stock return.(2) Higher managerial power leads higher executive compensation.(3) Effect of managerial power on executive compensation is more restricted in state-owned firms than in non-state-owned firms.(4) Higher executive compensation leads more agency costs rather than reducing them.These results suggest that there are managerial entrenchments in determining executive compensation packages,and such managerial entrenchments reduce compensation's incentive effects.
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