股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策

上市公司控股股东是否直接或以现金股利方式间接侵占公司资金一直是困绕学术界和实务界的共同性问题。与以往的研究不同,本文发现现金股利和资金侵占同是大股东实现其股权价值最大化的手段,二者具有可替代性,协整检验的结果也表明二者不是弱外生变量。本文通过联立方程模型将上市公司现金股利政策与资金侵占结合起来考虑,发现国有控股的公司发放的现金股利水平在前一阶段最高;国有法人控股的公司,现金股利发放的水平在后两阶段最高,但资金被侵占的程度最低;社会法人控股股东对现金股利的偏好与国有法人控股股东无异,但其控股的公司资金被侵占的程度最为严重;国有股控股的公司,其资金被侵占的程度介于二者之间。本文通过对公司股利政策的连续考察发现随着证监会推进上市公司改革的逐步深入,非流通股控股股东减少了对上市公司资金的直接侵占,但现金股利形式却变得越来越普遍。

Resource Predation Under Deferent Controlling Shareholder and Cash Dividend Policy

Unlike prior research,this paper use simultaneous model to research cash dividend policy made by listed firms controlled by government,state-owned shareholders and privately owned shareholders,and found that paying-out and tunneling are both methods which controlling shareholders used to maximize their shares value.We also document that when the company is controlled by state-owned shareholders,the degrees of resource being seized and paying-out are lowest;when it is controlled by privately owned shareholder,the situation is just contrary;and when controlled by government,the situation is moderate.After investigating dividend policies in a successive 5 years period,we found that along with the CSRC pushed the reformation of corporate governance forward,the degree of listed firms' assets being seized by controlled shareholders was getting lower and lower.Instead of predating more assets from listed firms,the controlling shareholder turned to make listed firms pay more cash dividends.