信息结构、风险偏好与盈余操纵行为——一次实验研究的结论

运用实验方法构建具有不同信息结构的市场环境,研究风险偏好与外部监管环境对盈余操纵行为的影响。实验结果表明,外部监管环境对盈余操纵行为具有显著约束作用;信息不对称时,信息成本将加重操纵程度,内幕交易者借助信息优势,或者回避风险,或者获取超额收益;非内幕交易者存在过度自信表现;信息结构不影响风险偏好者的操纵意愿。但与外部惩戒力共同影响其最终收益。

Information Structure, Risk Preference and Earnings Manipulation Behavior

the impact of risk preference and external supervising on earnings manipulation behavior.The results indicate that external supervising has a restriction effect on earnings manipulation behavior remarkably:external supervising coefficient,the combination of punishment co- efficient and spot test probability,has an integrative effect,which is higher than the effect respectively;Under the conditions of infor- mation asymmetry,information obtained by the insiders can be diffused through the market.Relied on information superiority,the insid- ers can avoid risks and acquire surplus earnings;Non-insiders have overconfident performance;Information structures don't affect manip- ulation wills of the person with the risk preference,but have a conjunct influence on the ultimate earnings with the external supervising.