非国有大股东对国企超额雇员的影响:成本效应还是激励效应

基于竞争理论的国企改革思路强调减少政策性负担摊派,基于产权理论的改革思路侧重于引入非国有资本,以解决产权不清晰与所有者缺位问题.本文尝试融合两种理论,以国企超额雇员问题为研究对象,从非国有大股东视角探究混合所有制改革成效.研究发现:非国有大股东能够显著降低国企超额雇员,减弱超额雇员对公司价值的损害作用,且该治理作用会随非国有大股东相对力量的提高而增强;从作用机制来看,该治理作用不仅表现为劳动力成本尤其是员工薪酬的节约,还表现为内部薪酬差距和管理层薪酬业绩敏感性的提高,兼具成本效应与激励效应;该作用在地区就业压力较小、劳动密集度较低以及劳动保护水平更低的环境下更为显著.

The Influence of Non-state-owned Blockholders on the Excess Employees of State-owned Enterprises: Cost Effect or Incentive Effect

Based on the competition theory,the reform of state-owned enterprises emphasizes to reduce the burden of policy.The reform of property rights theory focuses on the introduction of non-state-owned capital to solve the problem of unclear properly rights and absence of owners.By taking the problem of excess employees of state-owned enterprises as the research object,this paper attempts to integrate these two theories,to explore the effect of mixed ownership reform from the perspective of non-state major shareholders.The results show that:the non-state-owned major shareholders can significantly reduce the excess employees of state-owned enterprises,and weaken the damage to the value of enterprises caused by the excess employees,and the positive governance effect will increase with the increase of the relative strength of the non-state-owned major shareholders;from the perspective of mechanism,this governance effect is not only reflected in the saving of labor costs,especially the saving of employees’compensation,but also the enhancement of the internal pay gap and the pay-performance sensitivity,and have both cost effect and incentive effect.And this effect is more significant in the environment of lower employment pressure,lower labor intensity and lower level of labor protection.