关系股东与融资约束——基于系族集团的经验证据

已有研究指出,控股股东的关系股东加剧了控股股东与中小股东间的利益冲突.关系股东是否具有积极的一面,研究中尚缺乏关注.本文以2003-2017年间附属于系族集团的A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证检验了系族成员关系股东是否以及如何影响融资约束.研究发现,相对于没有关系股东的系族成员,有关系股东的成员企业面临的融资约束更低,在考虑内生性问题后结论依然稳健.进一步研究表明,关系股东通过降低实际控制人与成员企业的信息不对称、促进内部资本市场资源优化配置,以及降低管理层代理成本从而缓解所在成员企业的融资约束.本文揭示了关系股东对融资约束的影响及作用机理,丰富了关系股东与内部资本市场经济后果方面的研究.

Related Large Shareholders and Financial Constraints: Evidence from “Xi Zu” Group

Prior research documents that related large shareholders of controlling shareholders exacerbate agency problems between large shareholders and minority shareholders.However,few studies focus on the bright side of related large shareholders.Using a sample of A-share listed firms affiliated to“Xi Zu”Group between 2003 and 2017,this paper investigates whether and how related large shareholders affect financial constraints.The results show that“Xi Zu”members with related large shareholders have smaller financial constraints compared to those without related large shareholders.We confirm the results after controlling for possible endogeneity.Further studies show that related large shareholders reduce information asymmetry between“Xi Zu”Group members and the controller of“Xi Zu”,improve resources allocation efficiency and decrease the first type of agency cost so to relieve financial constraints.This paper contributes to the literature about the economic consequences of related large shareholders and internal capital markets by identifying the effect of related large shareholders on financial constraints and the mechanisms in it.