关键下属高管晋升锦标赛的创新激励效应研究

本文以2006-2016年我国A股上市公司为样本,探讨关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距如何影响企业创新.研究发现:关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距越大,企业创新产出越高.进一步地,相比整个高管团队内部的薪酬差距,关键下属高管与CEO之间的薪酬差距对企业创新的影响更强;关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距对企业创新的激励效应主要体现在关键下属高管晋升CEO的机会较大时,以及国有企业和技术密集型行业中.此外,降低代理成本是关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进企业创新的重要作用机制,且关键下属高管-CEO薪酬差距促进了企业创新对企业价值的提升作用.本文研究结论对推动企业创新及优化上市公司高管薪酬激励体系具有重要的现实意义.

Research on the Innovation Incentive Effect of Promotion Tournament for Key Subordinate Executives

Selecting the A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2016 in Chinese security market as samples,empirical research found that the pay gap between the key subordinate executives and CEO is positively related to corporate innovation.Furthermore,compared with the pay gap in the entire executive team,the pay gap between the key subordinate executives and CEO has a stronger influence on corporate innovation.The incentive effect of key executives-CEO pay gap on corporate innovation is mainly reflected when key subordinate executives have greater opportunities for promotion to CEO,as well as in state-owned enterprises and technology-intensive industries.In addition,the result of mediating effect test shows that agency efficiency plays an important mediating role in the influencing mechanism of the pay gap between the key subordinate executives and CEO on corporate innovation,and the result of economic consequence test shows that the pay gap between the key subordinate executives and CEO may facilitate the value-raised role of corporate innovation on the company.These results have important theoretical and practical significance for promoting company innovation and optimizing the executive compensation incentive system of listed companies.