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审计的契约安排与独立性的互动机制
引用本文:刘国常,赵兴楣,杨小锋.审计的契约安排与独立性的互动机制[J].会计研究,2007,1(9):90-94.
作者姓名:刘国常  赵兴楣  杨小锋
作者单位:暨南大学管理学院,510632
摘    要:审计契约的内外两个层面分别为审计质量提供执业胜任能力与独立性的支持。利益主体在人格化上的分化使得外部审计契约采用了正式契约和非正式契约两种形式,共同为独立性提供制度安排。正式契约影响审计者的即时经济收益,决定了审计者不可能超然独立于特定的相对人;非正式契约影响审计者的未来经济收益,为独立性在制度安排上提供了一种救济。声誉是非正式契约的自履行机制,它与独立性形成了一种互动机制。一个良好的声誉机制包括信誉体系和司法救济两个方面,政府的作用就是推动信誉体系的建设和提供有效的司法救济。

关 键 词:审计契约  独立性  声誉机制  司法救济

The Auditing Contracts and the Independent Institution Arrangement
Liu Guochang.The Auditing Contracts and the Independent Institution Arrangement[J].Accounting Research,2007,1(9):90-94.
Authors:Liu Guochang
Abstract:The inside auditing contract serves auditor's practicing ability,and the outside one composed of two parts as formal and informal ones is the institution arrangement for independence.The personal identity of individuals in exchanges should account for outside contract's separation.Auditor cannot be completely independent because he benefits from the formal contract with the personal individuals,but the informal contract will be a relief to this defect.Reputation acts as a self-enforcing mechanism of informal contract and interacts with independence which can be actively kept by auditor because of the incentive provided by the institution.Government's role is to promote constructing of a credit system and to provide judicial relief to impersonal individuals.
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