信息披露制度变迁与欺诈管制

在自愿信息披露制度下,资质优良、业绩不俗的公司有动力通过自愿信息披露突出自身竞争优势。本文具体分析了自愿信息披露行为作为一种信号传递机制必须满足的三个假设,即理性的管理者、知情投资者和真实信息披露;在自愿信息披露弱化的三种情况下,强制信息披露制度成为提升信息披露的必然手段,信息披露制度也由自愿向强制转变,但同时伴随信息披露制度的变迁产生了新的联合欺诈行为;因此,信息欺诈贯穿整个信息披露制度的变迁过程,无论强制披露制度还是自愿披露制度,其根本目的在于对信息欺诈的禁止,但欺诈并没有因制度的变迁而消失,所以解决信息欺诈的关键在于建立反欺诈管制,只有这样才能从根本上阻止信息欺诈的行为。

The Changing of Information Disclosure System and Fraud Regulation

Under voluntary information disclosure system,the companies with good property and excellent performances have the motivation to show their competitive advantages by disclosing voluntary information.The paper analyzes that voluntary disclosure is a signaling mechanism,which assumes that managers rationally pursue wealth maximization goals and all the investors are informed.And the most important is true disclosure.Then the author analyzes the situations against the premises,which might result in voluntary disclosure failure.So mandatory disclosure system is necessary,and the information disclosure system changes to be compelled.But in the meantime,the new alliances still occur to cheat investors.Then the paper concludes that both voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure attempt to forbid fraud,but fraud still exists throughout the vicissitude.The key of solving information fraud is anti-fraud regulation system,which can prevent cheating ultimately.