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成本管理信息租金、内部冲突与控制绩效——基于施工项目的实验研究
引用本文:王新,毛洪涛,曾静.成本管理信息租金、内部冲突与控制绩效——基于施工项目的实验研究[J].会计研究,2012(8):25-33,96.
作者姓名:王新  毛洪涛  曾静
作者单位:西南财经大学国际商学院/会计学院 611130
基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目,教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划,教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目,财政部全国会计领军(后备)人才培训项目资助
摘    要:本文采用实验研究的方法,针对施工项目的成本控制绩效问题展开研究,探讨了施工项目特点对经理人成本控制中信息租金的影响及对制定目标责任成本过程中委托代理双方冲突的影响,并在此基础上进一步分析信息租金、内部冲突单独和两者交互对施工项目责任成本控制绩效的影响。研究发现,由于施工项目关键成本因素难以被定量化,成本计算不具备重复可验证性,当施工项目成本节余空间较大时将导致项目部经理人的寻租行为,但信息租金会随着博弈次数的不断增加而减少。信息租金和博弈冲突均对项目部的全年成本绩效具有不利影响,但当外部环境为奖励机制时,冲突与信息租金的交互作用能够提升企业的成本控制绩效。依据实验结论,本文提供了相应的政策建议。

关 键 词:信息租金  内部冲突  控制绩效

Information Rent, Internal Conflicts and Control Performance in Cost Management An Experimental Study on Construction Projects
Institution:Wang Xin et al.
Abstract:This paper conducts an experimental study on the cost control performance in construction projects. We discuss the influence of the characteristics of construction projects on CEO’s information rent in cost control and on interest conflicts between the principal and agent in the procedure of setting target cost. Furthermore, we analyze how the information rent, internal conflicts, and their interaction affect the cost control performance in construction projects. We find that: (1) it is hard to quantify the core cost factors in construction projects, and (2) the calculation of cost is not replicable. Therefore, projects executives have motivation to extract rent when cost saving margin is large, while the information rent decreases as the frequency of gaming increases. Information rent and gaming conflicts both have adverse effect on the annual cost control performance. However, the interaction of information rent and gaming conflicts could promote cost control performance when external environment is in a reward mechanism. We also contribute to the literature by providing suggestions to policy makers.
Keywords:
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