投资者保护与控股股东资产偏好

本文从控股股东资产偏好的角度构建了一个在股权集中型公司中研究控股股东侵占中小股东利益的行为决策分析框架。理论分析表明,投资者保护可以缓解因控股股东对流动性资产的偏好而形成的投资不足,但公司现金持有水平取决于公司投资不足和控股股东资产转移两个方面的净效应。实证研究结果证实了较好的投资者保护能够在一定程度上缓解公司投资不足,并抑制控股股东的资产转移动机,从而促使外部投资者对公司所持有的现金予以较高的价值评估。我们还发现中国上市公司控股股东较高的现金流权对应着较高的控制权,其结果是加剧公司投资不足,导致公司现金水平较高而现金价值较低。

Investor Protection and the Assets Preference of the Controlling Shareholders

Based on the highly concentrated ownership structure of listed companies and the under-developed capital markets in China, this paper builds a framework to analyze the assets preference and expropriate decisions of the controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholders prefer liquid assets because they can obtain private benefits of control by diverting the liquid assets, which make the companies into underinvestment. The theoretical model shows that investor protection can ease the extent of underinves...