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监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究
引用本文:刘星,刘伟.监督,抑或共谋?——我国上市公司股权结构与公司价值的关系研究[J].会计研究,2007,58(6):68-75.
作者姓名:刘星  刘伟
作者单位:1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,400030
2. 汕头大学商学院,515063
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70372041),教育部高校博士学科点基金资助项目(20060611025)的阶段性成果之一
摘    要:本文通过扩展LLSV(2002)的模型,在监督与共谋的视角下分析了大股东之间分享控制权的治理模式对公司价值的影响,并利用2000—2004年间我国上市公司的样本数据进行实证检验。研究发现:(1)股权集中度、股权制衡度与公司价值之间均存在显著的正相关关系;(2)在不同股东性质的公司中,股权制衡的效果存在明显差异,尤其当第一、二大股东均属于非国有性质时,股权制衡难以发挥积极作用。这些研究结果表明其他大股东虽然能够起监督作用,但也可能与控股股东达成共谋以分享控制权收益。

关 键 词:控制权收益  股权结构  股权制衡  公司价值

Monitoring or Colluding?——Study on the Relationship between Shareholder Structure and Firm Value in China's Listed Companies
Liu Xing,Liu Wei.Monitoring or Colluding?——Study on the Relationship between Shareholder Structure and Firm Value in China's Listed Companies[J].Accounting Research,2007,58(6):68-75.
Authors:Liu Xing  Liu Wei
Abstract:From the view of monitoring and collusion among multiple large shareholders(MLS),this paper investigates the effects of corporate governance of MLS on the firm value,by extending LLSV model in 2002.Using data on China's listed companies from 2000 to 2004,we show,consistent with our model,that ownership concentration and the presence of MLS have positive effects on firm value and that the relation between MLS and firm value is significantly affected by their identities,which suggest that other large shareholders can monitor dominative shareholders and yet be collusive for sharing benefits of control right in some conditions.
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