管理层权力、机会主义动机与股权激励计划设计

以2005-2011年期间公告或实施股权激励计划的上市公司为样本,利用股权激励预案公告日前一天公司股价与前一个月公司平均股价的较高者减去股权激励预案中设定的初始行权价格以后的差额数据,本文对管理层权力与股权激励计划制定中的管理层机会主义行为之间的关系进行了实证研究。发现,管理层权力越大,股权激励计划中所设定的初始行权价格就相对越低,即,在当前公司内部治理机制弱化的背景下,管理层可能会利用其对公司的控制权影响股权激励方案的制定,使其与己有利。还发现,相对于非国资控股公司,国资控股公司推出的股权激励计划所设定的行权价格更低。这表明,要想使得股权激励真正成为解决代理问题的有效手段,必须重视其设计有效性。

Managerial Power,Opportunism Motivation and Equity Incentive Plan Design

Using the samples of listed companies which announced equity incentive program during the 2005-2011,this paper investigates the relationship between managerial power and managerial opportunism in the equity incentive plan formulation process based on the data of the variance which is the higher one between the stock price on the first day and the average share price during a month before the equity incentive plan is announced minus the initial exercise price set in the equity incentive plan.This paper finds that:The greater the managerial power is,the relatively lower the initial exercise price in the equity incentive plan is.Compared with the non state-owned holding company,the initial exercise price in the equity incentive plan being implemented by state-owned holding company is lower.