| 业绩指标、业绩风险与高管人员报酬的敏感性 |
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| 引用本文： | 陈震,张鸣.业绩指标、业绩风险与高管人员报酬的敏感性[J].会计研究,2008(2). |
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| 作者姓名： | 陈震 张鸣 |
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| 摘 要： | 本文论述了通过提高高管人员报酬——业绩敏感性来激励高管人员努力工作,要受到业绩指标选择和业绩风险大小的影响。针对我国上市公司的实证研究发现,在控制公司规模、股权结构和公司成长性因素后,上市公司高管人员报酬契约能够针对高管人员职责的不同,合理选择业绩指标的报酬——业绩敏感性。但是,实证研究没有发现业绩风险大小对高管人员报酬——业绩敏感性有影响的证据。
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| 关 键 词： | 业绩指标 业绩风险 报酬——业绩敏感性 |
Performance index, Performance risk and Pay-performance sensitivity |
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| Chen Zhen,Zhang Ming.Performance index, Performance risk and Pay-performance sensitivity[J].Accounting Research,2008(2). |
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| Authors: | Chen Zhen Zhang Ming |
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| Abstract: | This text has proved that the consistency of senior executives' pay and shareholders' interests,namely pay-performance sensitivity,must not improve company's performance.Attempt to improve company's performance through raising senior executives' pay-performance sensitivity should be determined by two factors:performance index and performance risk.Research to the medical & biological listed companies in China,we find that there is the different pay-performance sensitivity on different performance index and there isn't consideration on performance risk in the agreement. |
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